To Chase or Not to Chase

Last month I wrote about the Supreme Court's recent decision in which it determined that it was not "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment for police to terminate a high-speed chase of a non-violent suspect by wrecking his car (leaving his paralyzed). Over at FindLaw, Sherry Colb chimes in with some observations I agree with. After lamenting the Court's decision to play fact finder, she notes:

The worst aspect of the Court's decision, however, is not its jury-preempting finding, on the basis of the video, that the high-speed chase in which Harris and the police were engaged posed a substantial risk of harm to the population. Few would dispute that high-speed chases generally pose a risk of serious injury, even if the particular conditions present in this case might have minimized that risk.

What makes the decision most alarming, in my view, is its underlying assumption that if, in fact, Victor Harris's driving during the chase endangered the safety of surrounding people, then the "reasonable" thing for the police to do was to continue the chase and ultimately force Harris into a life-threatening crash.

Later on, she continues:

Victor Harris's original speed, according to the majority as well as the dissent, represented an "ordinary" or "minor" traffic violation. Prior to the chase itself, that is, neither side claims that it would have been appropriate for the police to inflict catastrophic, life-long injury on Victor Harris for speeding. No Justice suggests that it would have been acceptable, at that point, to "go ahead and take him out," as Officer Scott's supervisor said when the chase had escalated, arguably out of control. It was the decision of the police, however, first to pursue Harris for a traffic violation, and then to carry that pursuit to its bitter end, that profoundly and foreseeably raised the danger level faced by bystanders.

The Court, though, does not question the decision of the police to pursue Harris when he failed to pull over. Nor does it question the officers' decision to keep going as speeds mounted. On the contrary, the Court says that "[i]t was respondent, after all, who intentionally placed himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight that ultimately produced the choice between two evils that Scott [the police officer who rammed Harris] confronted." The only decision-maker, as far as a majority of the Court is concerned, was Harris. On this reasoning, his behavior made the police pursuit effectively inevitable.

The point, I think, is that at some point, there has to be a decision made by the cops that discretion is the better part of valor and they have to let the speeder go. Obviously, that doesn't apply to all chases of all suspects - someone who is wanted for a violent offense or has a hostage is a different situation entirely.