As a legal junkie, I love the Jehovah's Witnesses. They're dogged pursuit of their way of life - as strange as it seems to me - frequently winds up making good law in areas of religious freedom and freedom of expression. For example, it was Jehovah's Witnesses that fought the West Virginia requirement that all school children say the Pledge of Allegiance (in the good ol' pre-"under God" days) all the way to the Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). They won, too. JWs tend to push the boundaries of the law and create some real head scratchers.
Such is the case of Carol Ferenz, as reported by Findlaw. Ferenz was stabbed by her mentally deranged son. Rushed to a hospital for medical treatment, she was told that without a blood transfusion she would die. Being a JW, Ferenz refused the transfusion and soon thereafter had assumed room temperature. That's left the local prosecutor a little confused as to how to proceed criminally against the son, mental problems notwithstanding. Legally, it actually fairly clear - you take your victim as you find her, and if she refuses life saving treatment it's your problem that she then dies because of it.
But should it work that way? Should the fact that the victim had a very good chance of continuing to live had she been of "normal" beliefs in some way mitigate the attacker's culpability? Consider this hypothetical: Instead of a mother and son, the victim is a bitter ex-husband and the slasher is his bitter ex-wife. Once at the hospital, the husband is given the choice of a blood transfusion or death. The ex-husband,being the bitter sombitch he is, decides to die - just to piss of his ex-wife and leave her in as much hot water as humanly possible. The hospital does as he asks and the ex-husband dies. The ex-wife is charged with murder. Should the fact that the victim in that case died out of spite rather than live make any difference? How is that different from the JW?
One gut reaction is that while the JW victim was acting on a sincerely held religious belief (regardless of how fruity), the ex-husband victim was not acting from any deeply held belief. But should that matter? Assuming that both victims are competent to make the decision in the first place, should we green-light the one made based on religious belief but not the other? To do so would be to, in effect, endorse the JW victim's belief - not necessarily to promote her "religion" specifically, but give it sanction as a valid basis of action. In essence to provide a government stamp of approval on her belief system. That bothers the hell out of me, personally. The state should have no real reason to get involved in what happens in my mind until it makes me act out against other people. To OK the JW's act and not the ex-husband's act is discrimination on the basis of (lack of) religion.
The other gut reaction is that the ex-husband victim is simply crazy and therefore not competent to make this decision at this time. But why is he nuts but the JW victim is sane? Spite may be a poor motive for suicide, but so, in the eyes of many, is a devotion to a vengeful sky-god who will send you to hell rather than allow you to save yourself. Where do we draw the line?
In the end, I think the responsibility for the deaths in both cases lie with the attackers. But for their actions, neither victim would have been in a situation where such a decision was needed. Still, it's a fun problem to think about.
Tuesday, January 13, 2004
Who Exactly Killed Whom Here?
Posted by JD Byrne at 5:03 PM
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment